Open source · Author and maintainer
MailACL
Deterministic authenticated email aliases with stateless verification and explicit compatibility and security boundaries.
- Problem
- Create readable service-specific aliases that can be checked later without maintaining a database of every issued address.
- Constraints
- Preserve established alias formats, respect the email local-part byte limit, keep secret material out of process arguments, and explain the effect of tag truncation.
- Role
- Designed, implemented, documented, tested, and maintains the public shell utility and its security model.
- Approach
- Derive a stable HMAC-SHA-512 key from configured secret GPG material, generate Base36 suffix tags, and verify current and documented compatibility encodings without server-side issuance state.
- Verification
- A dependency-light synthetic regression suite covers deterministic vectors, compatibility formats, bad input, byte limits, failed key export, color behavior, and the no-OpenSSL implementation. Public CI runs syntax and static checks.
- Trade-offs
- Short tags are easier to guess, serialized key exports can change, and domain names are validated but are not HMAC inputs. Those boundaries are documented rather than hidden.
Security limit: MailACL does not sign messages, authenticate the human sender, prove delivery history, prevent forwarding, or replace mail-server access controls. A matching truncated tag proves only consistency with the configured secret-derived key at the selected tag length.